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EXECUTIVE POWER: FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PERIPHERY TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CORE 
MARK A. GRABER∗ 
In 2006, Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson announced that the United 
States was transforming into a “National Surveillance State.”1  This 
“National Surveillance State,” they claim “is characterized by a significant 
increase in government investments in technology and government 
bureaucracies devoted to promoting domestic security” as well as 
“gathering intelligence and surveillance using all of the devices that the 
digital revolution allows.”2  While the al Qaeda attack of September 11, 
2001 provided a crucial impetus for the development of this new regime, 
Balkin and Levinson insisted that the roots lie deeper.  The National 
Surveillance State is a product of the way in which the communications 
revolution has augmented the capacity of terrorist organizations and 
ordinary criminals to commit heinous crimes while similarly augmenting 
the capacity of government officials to use technology to prevent those 
crimes and identify those criminals.  As Balkin and Levinson note, 
“[f]ocusing on war as the primary cause of the National Surveillance State 
overlooks the fact that surveillance technologies that help the state track 
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 1.  Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From 
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2006). 
 2.  Id. at 520–21. 
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down terrorists can also be used to track and prevent domestic crime.”3  
Balkin and Levinson predicted that the National Surveillance State would 
be bipartisan.  They declared, “there may be no meaningful division 
between the Democratic and Republican Parties with regard to the 
imperatives for, and the broad outlines of, the National Surveillance State.”4  
Recent events suggest their prescience.  As Jack Goldsmith noted in a 
recent book, the Obama Administration’s efforts in the War on Terror far 
more resemble Bush Administration practices than candidate Obama’s 
promises.  “Contrary to nearly everyone’s expectations,” Goldsmith notes, 
“the Obama Administration would continue almost all of its predecessor’s 
policies, transforming what had seemed extraordinary under the Bush 
regime into the ‘new normal’ of American counterterrorism policy.”5  
Guantanamo Bay remains open, electronic surveillance continues, and 
Obama Administration officials, if anything, have increased the use of 
unmanned drones for assassination attempts on suspected terrorist leaders. 
Balkin and Levinson in 2006 maintained that “increased executive 
power is one of the key elements of the emerging constitutional 
revolution.”6  They regarded “enhancement of presidential power” as “the 
most important part of the Bush Administration’s constitutional agenda,” in 
particular “the need for strong executive leadership in . . . the ‘War on 
Terror.’”7  They foresaw a nearly inevitable “shift [in] institutional power 
and authority from Congress to the presidency” as a result of the National 
Surveillance State.8  One consequence of this transformation, they 
conclude, is “the scope of presidential authority to combat terrorism has 
become perhaps the central constitutional question of our era.”9  The first 
constitutional threat Balkin and Levinson warned Americans about was 
distinctive to the present.  “[T]he executive’s power to conduct war,” they 
feared, “will displace the area previously assumed to fall within the criminal 
justice system.”10  Persons treated as enemy combatants, lawful or 
unlawful, do not have the full range of rights as persons treated as 
murderers or ordinary criminals.  The other threat has deep roots in the 
American constitutional past.  Just as the Framers thought the 
distinguishing feature of “despotic government” was the “concentrat[ion]” 
                                                          
 3.  Id. at 522. 
 4.  Id. at 528. 
 5.  JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 
9/11, at 5 (2012).  See Julie Novkov, The Dangerous Fantasy of Lincoln: Framing Executive 
Power as Presidential Mastery, 73 MD. L. REV. 54, 64–65 (2013). 
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 9.  Id. at 520. 
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of “all the powers of government . . . in the same hands,”11 so Balkin and 
Levinson warn about “the inevitable dangers of concentrating too much 
power in one branch of government without accountability and 
transparency.”12 
Several important trends in American politics are also pushing 
separation of powers issues from the constitutional periphery to the 
constitutional core.  The United States is presently experiencing the longest 
period of divided government in the nation’s history.  Since Richard Nixon 
was elected in 1968, Democrats have controlled all three branches of 
government for eight years and Republicans for only four.  Each party has 
controlled at least one branch of the national government during the other 
thirty-two years.13  Unsurprisingly, much separation of powers law dates 
from the struggles Nixon had with Democrats in Congress over presidential 
war powers,14 executive privilege,15 and presidential authority to implement 
(or not) federal statutes.16  Every two-term president since Nixon has 
experienced one or more major separation of powers crises.17  The parties 
have become more polarized on more issues than at any other time in 
American history.18  Conservative Democrats and Liberal Republicans have 
disappeared.19  Polarized politics combined with divided government is a 
recipe for intense separation of powers conflicts, as partisans and interest 
groups struggle to empower the branch of government they control while 
enfeebling rival institutions. 
The centrality of constitutional concerns over executive power 
distinguishes the National Surveillance State and the contemporary era from 
almost any other constitutional regime experienced by the United States.  
                                                          
 11.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 311 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
 12.  Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 527. 
 13.  David Mayhew notes “encountering undergraduates and even young graduate students 
who seemed to view unified party control as a rare event on the order of an eclipse of the moon.” 
DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND 
INVESTIGATIONS, 1946–2002, at x (2nd ed. 2005). 
 14.  See 1 HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER, & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT 547–53 (2012). 
 15.  United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
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 17.  Consider the Iran-Contra Affair during the Reagan presidency, the Clinton impeachment, 
the controversy over Bush Administration policies during the War on Terror, and Obama 
Administration policies on both the War on Terror and the Defense of Marriage Act. 
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35, 44 (2000) (noting a marked polarization of the national parties at the elite level); Geoffrey C. 
Layman & Thomas M. Carsey, Party Polarization and “Conflict Extension” in the American 
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 19.  See NICOL C. RAE, SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS (1994); NICOL C. RAE, THE DECLINE AND 
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Robert McCloskey in his classic, The American Supreme Court,20 identified 
three constitutional eras before 1960.  The first was concerned with the 
relationship between the federal government and the states.  The second 
was concerned with the regulation of business enterprise.  The third was 
concerned with civil rights and liberties.21  Executive power and separation 
of powers issues played relatively minor roles in each of these regimes.  
Howard Gillman, Mark Graber and Keith Whittington’s American 
Constitutionalism22 pays more attention to issues of executive power in 
American history, devoting a section in each chapter to such issues.  
Nevertheless, the very chapter titles evince the relatively low salience of 
separation of powers controversies until recently.  Most chapters covering 
the first 175 years of constitutional practice in the United States are named 
for the dominant partisan coalition of the time or their central program, for 
example, the Jacksonian Era, the Republican Era, and the New Deal/Great 
Society Era.23  These categories highlight how the driving forces of 
American constitutional change in the nineteenth century and first two-
thirds of the twentieth century were visions that united most governing 
officials.  Before 1968, national separation of powers issues tended either to 
be such isolated episodes as whether President Truman could seize the steel 
mines24 or such struggles between coalitional partners as were the debates 
over habeas corpus and martial law during the Civil War.25 
The 2013 University of Maryland Constitutional Law Schmooze 
sought to explore this new constitutional universe in which executive power 
is arguably the most central constitutional issue challenging the political 
regime.26  Participants from the legal academy, the social sciences, and the 
humanities considered a wide range of topics.  Contributions explored 
presidential authority from Abraham Lincoln to Barack Obama.  
Conversations ranged from presidential management of the War on Terror 
to executive interventions in the cultural wars. 
                                                          
 20.  ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (Sanford Levinson, ed., 4th ed., 
rev. 2005). 
 21.  Id. at 15, 121–22. 
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 23.  See id. at v–x. 
 24.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 25.  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).  See 
generally, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 14, at 
295–316.  My sense is that outside of these materials, few constitutional law casebooks give any 
attention to separation of powers cases or issues that were debated before Richard Nixon took 
office. 
 26.  For a brief outline of the nature of a schmooze, see Mark A. Graber, Foreword: From the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty to Juristocracy and the Political Construction of Judicial Power, 
65 MD. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006). 
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Two problems emerged as central to both the Schmooze conversations 
and executive power in the modern state.  The first concern is the extent to 
which presidential discretion ought to be more cabined or increasingly 
unleashed in the modern state.  Carl Schmitt and his contemporary 
followers insist that extensive executive prerogative powers are the sine qua 
non of the modern state, a permanent feature of constitutional politics.27  
Presidents are at most checked by politics, and we are told law no longer 
plays a role in alleged separation of powers systems.28  Other commentators 
insist that finding legal constraints on executive power remains as vital 
today as in 178729 or that increased interbranch deliberation is essential to 
ensuring fundamental constitutional ends.30  The second concern is the 
status of rights in a world where the Executive plays a much greater role 
than other institutions in determining who is at liberty to do what.  Much 
inherited wisdom proclaims that courts are vital means for preventing 
ambitious executives from violating fundamental liberties.31  The Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld32 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld33 are 
Exhibits A and B for this position.  Nevertheless, as both the Emancipation 
Proclamation34 and the Obama Administration’s refusal to defend the 
Defense of Marriage Act in court35 demonstrate, the executive branch may 
be an effective bully pulpit for certain rights causes. 
Kimberley L. Fletcher provides some historical background for the 
increased presidential discretion exhibited by both the Bush and Obama 
                                                          
 27.  See CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Jeffrey Seitzer, ed. & trans., Duke 
University Press, 2008) (1928). 
 28.  See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2011). 
 29.  See generally HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH’S LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON 
TERROR (2009); PETER N. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER 
THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009). 
 30.  See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013); MARIAH 
ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY (2013). 
 31.  The canonical citations here are Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940) 
(“[C]ourts stand against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise 
suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming victims 
of prejudice and public excitement.”) and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from 
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials 
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”). 
 32.  542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 33.  548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 34.  Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation, in 6 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 28–30 (Roy P. Basler, ed., 1953).   
 35.  Eric Holder, Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on Litigation Involving the 
Defense of Marriage Act (February 23, 2011), in 2 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 
14, at 945. 
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Administrations in foreign affairs.  In her view, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation36 provided 
crucial foundations for contemporary views that presidents have enhanced 
freedom of action abroad.  The federal judiciary before 1936, she claims, 
strictly policed executive discretion, limiting presidential war powers, for 
example, to opposing sudden invasions and fighting wars declared by 
Congress.37  Fletcher maintains that Justice George Sutherland’s opinion in 
Curtiss-Wright, by taking a quote from Congressmen John Marshall out of 
context, put executive power on a new, far more dangerous path.  When 
Marshall in 1800 declared that “[t]he President is the sole organ of the 
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign 
nations,”38 he meant that presidents were responsible for “announcing, not 
formulating—American foreign policy.”39  In the hands of Sutherland, 
future Justices, and contemporary members of the State Department, 
Marshall’s quote was reinterpreted as giving the President near exclusive 
power to make foreign policy.  As Fletcher details, Sutherland’s opinion 
among attorneys from the executive branch quickly became the “‘Curtiss-
Wright, so I’m right’ cite” whenever the need arose to sanction presidential 
discretion to use military force or intervene in a foreign crises.40  Truman 
was the first President who assumed increased executive war powers to 
fight “long wars,”41 but Fletcher reminds us of the crucial role a unanimous 
Court played in Curtiss-Wright, giving judicial blessing to “the growth of 
the President’s unilateral powers and institutionaliz[ing] this prerogative in 
the area of foreign affairs.”42 
Clement Fatovic makes the important point that the difference between 
executive powers cabined by law and the extralegal prerogative powers 
Fletcher and others fear may be less than meets the theoretical eye.  Fatovic 
observes that “executive power and prerogative” lie “along a continuum 
that stretches from the least rule-bound to the most rule-bound exercises of 
power.”43  Just as “legal rules structure and regulate exercises of even the 
most extraordinary forms of prerogative,” so “there is an unavoidable 
element of discretion irreducible to law in even the most ordinary exercises 
                                                          
 36.  299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 37.  Kimberley L. Fletcher, The Court’s Decisive Hand Shapes The Executive’s Foreign 
Affairs Policymaking Power, 73 Md. L. Rev. 247 (2013). 
 38.  10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800). 
 39.  See Fletcher, supra note 37, at 260.  
 40.  Id. at 285 (citation omitted). 
 41.  See GRIFFIN, supra note 30, at 52–98. 
 42.  Fletcher, supra note 37, at 286. 
 43.  Clement Fatovic, Blurring the Lines: The Continuities Between Executive Power and 
Prerogative, 73 MD. L. REV. 15, 16 (2013). 
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of executive power.”44  Presidents must inevitably make policy when 
implementing federal law.  “[T]he very act of following a rule,” Fatovic 
notes, “involves an act of interpretation that is always to some degree 
discretionary.”45  More often than not, presidential prerogative powers have 
roots in congressional mandates.  Fatovic details how “much of the 
tremendous growth in executive power has been the result of statutory 
delegations.”46  The Framers are notoriously unhelpful when Americans in 
the twenty-first century make efforts to distinguish when prerogative power 
goes too far, since James Madison and associates did not provide clear 
boundaries for executive prerogative.47  As a result, Fatovic concludes 
“there may be an element of prerogative in all executive power.”48 
These ambiguities provide numerous openings for presidents to refrain 
from implementing laws passed by Congress.  Corinna Barrett Lain notes 
that executives have at least three “passive-aggressive” options other than 
refusing to implement a law (while hoping no one complains) and 
implementing the law under protest.49  Executives can implement laws in 
ways that undermine the purpose of the law.  Montana responded to a 
federal law mandating a 55-miles per hour limit on state highways by fining 
speeders five dollars while making clear to police officers that the revenue 
from the fines was far less than the enforcement and processing costs.50  
The congressional demand that Montana legally limit speeding was 
complied with, but no speeding was actually deterred.51  Given the 
inevitable scarcity of resources, executives can declare that they lack the 
finances necessary to implement the law.  The Obama Administration has 
informed federal attorneys that in light of “limited investigative and 
prosecutorial resources,” they should not bother marijuana users who are 
complying with local laws.52  Changes in professional practices may enable 
executives to claim they lack the expertise to implement the law.  The 
Carter Administration refused to implement federal judicial decisions 
declaring that gay and lesbian aliens not be admitted to the United States as 
“psychopathic personalities”53 after psychiatrists abandoned previous 
                                                          
 44.  Id.   
 45.  Id. at 20. 
 46.  Id. at 29. 
 47.  Id. at 37–44.  See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 244–87 (1996). 
 48.  Fatovic, supra note 43, at 53. 
 49.  Corinna Barrett Lain, Passive-Aggressive Executive Power, 73 MD. L. REV. 227, 227–28 
(2013). 
 50.  Id. at 232–35. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 237–39 (citation omitted). 
 53.  Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 120 (1967). 
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beliefs that homosexuality was a disorder.54  These alternatives, Lain states, 
have severe democratic problems.  They “shirk[] executive branch duties,” 
and send “inconsistent signals about where, when, and how laws will be 
enforced.”55 
Kathleen Tipler is more enthusiastic about the democratic virtues of 
presidential power not to enforce laws.  Following a Jacksonian model of 
the presidency, which emphasizes that the President holds the only office 
“elected by the nation,”56 she sees the President as having distinctive 
representative duties.  She writes, “both the electoral character of the 
executive office as outlined in Article II, as well as the Take Care Clause, 
generate a constitutional duty of democratic representation.”57  As such, the 
President may have special obligations to lead as a constitutional interpreter 
and to support the powerless.  Both obligations, in Tipler’s view, justify the 
apparent paradoxical willingness of President Obama to implement the 
Defense of Marriage Act, but not defend that measure in court.  In her view, 
putting aside some complex standing issues, “the Obama Administration 
engaged in a constitutionally adequate balancing of conflicting 
constitutional duties including conflicting duties of representation.”58  In 
particular, Tipler maintains that the decision not to defend DOMA in court 
was consistent with Obama’s previous “campaign promise to work for 
LGBT rights,”59 and consistent with an executive obligation to give “special 
protection [to] historically disempowered minorities,”60 while possibly 
creating “conditions more conducive to dialogue and persuasion.”61 
Peter E. Quint worries about the personnel who will implement  
presidential decisions not to enforce or, more often, enforce federal law in 
light of presidential policies.62  He maintains a clear distinction exists 
between the role of the Senate in confirming federal Justices and the Senate 
role in confirming executive branch officials.  The Senate ought to review 
the credentials of federal Justices carefully, in his view, because Justices 
have independent authority to interpret the law.  Quint writes, “[t]he 
                                                          
 54.  Lain, supra note 49, at 240–41. 
 55.  Id. at 246. 
 56.  Kathleen Tipler, Obama Administration’s Non-Defense of DOMA and the Executive Duty 
to Represent, 73 MD. L. REV. 287, 300 (2013).  See Andrew Jackson, Paper on the Removal of the 
Deposits, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 14, at 
235. 
 57.  Tipler, supra note 56, at 290.  
 58.  Id. at 306. 
 59.  Id. at 307–08. 
 60.  Id. at 308. 
 61.  Id. at 311. 
 62.  Peter E. Quint, Implications of the President’s Appointment Power, 73 MD. L. REV. 85 
(2013). 
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President and the Senate are collaborating in the choice of a member of the 
third branch. . . . [I]t is an independent branch not within the actual purview 
of either of the departments that are collaborating in the choice.”63  Far less 
Senate scrutiny is justified when the President recommends an executive 
branch appointment.  These persons are responsible for carrying out 
executive branch policy.  Thus, Quint thinks the Supreme Court, when 
considering questions about the presidential appointment and removal 
powers, as the Justices will be doing in 2014 when resolving Noel Canning 
v. NLRB,64 should interpret the Constitution “to give significant weight to 
the President’s authority to appoint those executive officers who, in the 
President’s opinion, are most fit for the purpose of exercising discretion 
under Article II . . . .”65 
Henry L. Chambers, Jr. invokes Abraham Lincoln when justifying 
broad presidential power under the Take Care Clause of Article II, which 
declares that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”66  Chambers is particularly interested in the constitutionality of 
the Emancipation Proclamation, which he claims might be better justified 
by the President’s “Take Care” power than, as was actually the case, the 
presidential power as Commander in Chief.67  Lincoln was on strong 
constitutional grounds when freeing slaves owned by disloyal masters.  
Doing so merely implemented the First and Second Confiscation Acts.68  
More controversially, Chambers points out that the Emancipation 
Proclamation might be understood as implementing the more general anti-
slavery animus underlying various congressional programs enacted by the 
Thirty-Seventh Congress.  “[W]hen taken as a whole,” he declares, “Civil 
War legislation passed before the Emancipation Proclamation was issued 
makes clear that Congress was willing to move toward emancipation as a 
war measure.”69  Lincoln, when deciding to free slaves of both disloyal and 
loyal citizens in places under Confederate control, in this view, was 
faithfully executing the vision animating congressional measures, what 
                                                          
 63.  Id. at 86–87. 
 64.  705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013).  
 65.  Quint, supra note 62, at 97. 
 66.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 67.  Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Lincoln, the Emancipation Proclamation, and Executive Power, 
73 MD. L. REV. 100, 101–02 (2013).  Chambers notes that the preliminary drafts of the 
Emancipation Proclamation placed greater emphasis on previous legislation than the final version 
Lincoln issued.  Id. at 115–16.  Compare Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation—First 
Draft, in 5 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 34, at 336–37, with 
Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation, in 6 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN, supra note 34, at 28–30. 
 68.  Chambers, supra note 67, at 125–27. 
 69.  Id. at 103–04. 
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Chambers calls “the general arc of legislation,”70 even if Lincoln’s precise 
actions were not explicitly warranted by any federal statute. 
Julie Novkov is more interested in debunking, or at least interrogating, 
what might be called the “Lincoln would, so it must be good” citation 
practice.71  She begins by noting how both President George W. Bush and 
President Barack Obama have sought public approval for unilateral 
exercises of presidential power by appealing to Lincoln’s example.  Both 
Presidents, Novkov observes, have “courted comparisons to Lincoln and 
invoked him.”72  Bush cited Lincoln in justifying his policies in the War on 
Terror.73  Obama does so when presenting himself as a racial moderate and 
calling for bipartisanship.74  The result is to sanctify everything Lincoln did, 
much of which might be questionable.  Novkov is particularly disturbed by 
how the movie Lincoln invokes Lincoln hagiography for subtle right-wing 
purposes.  By presenting the Thirteenth Amendment as devoted almost 
exclusively to the abolition of human bondage, a claim that is almost 
certainly wrong historically,75 and formal legal equality only, the producers 
are privileging an anti-classification interpretation of the post-Civil War 
amendments as opposed to a more progressive anti-subordination 
interpretation that might provide greater justification for affirmative action 
and other measures that will help persons of color.  In doing so, Novkov 
fears, Lincoln “reinforces a particular strand of conservative racial ideology 
that understands the civil rights movement and legal reforms of the 
twentieth century to have achieved the promise of racial equality, leaving 
the responsibility for remaining inequalities squarely on the shoulders of 
those experiencing them.”76 
Leslie F. Goldstein is somewhat more optimistic about executive 
capacity to protect rights.77  Her comparative study of how different 
institutions responded to claims made by various minorities during the late 
nineteenth century finds that the national executive was somewhat more 
progressive than the other branches of government.  She notes how “[t]he 
administration of (Republican) President Theodore Roosevelt provides a 
                                                          
 70.  Id. at 130. 
 71.  Julie Novkov, The Dangerous Fantasy of Lincoln: Framing Executive Power as 
Presidential Mastery, 73 MD. L. REV. 54 (2013). 
 72.  Id. at 70. 
 73.  Id. at 67–68. 
 74.  Id. at 70, 74–75. 
 75.  See Symposium, The Thirteenth Amendment: Meaning, Enforcement, and Contemporary 
Implications, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1447 (2012); Symposium, The Maryland Constitutional Law 
Schmooze, 71 MD. L. REV. 12 (2011). 
 76.  Novkov, supra note 71, at 82. 
 77.  Leslie F. Goldstein, How Equal Protection Did and Did Not Come to the United States, 
and the Executive Branch Role Therein, 73 MD. L. REV. 190 (2013). 
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limited exception to the otherwise dismal picture for African American civil 
rights that prevailed between 1885 and 1910.”78  In a time period when 
Congress repealed civil rights laws79 and the Supreme Court sustained 
racial segregation80 while refusing to intervene when minorities were 
fraudulently disenfranchised,81 Roosevelt “prosecute[d] Klan-type mobs” 
and other persons who violently sought to subordinate racial minorities.82  
Goldstein admits that her data is limited and bound to a particular period.  
Nevertheless, her study provides some reason for thinking that the 
President, at times, may have the right balance of relative electoral 
insulation and national responsibility necessary to lead some crusades for 
justice while preserving the gains of previous crusades.  Presidential 
protection of rights, Goldstein suggests, reflects “the presidency [having] a 
constituency significantly different from that of the House of 
Representatives,” and “an international diplomatic constituency” that 
“played a role in moderating . . . Congress’s inclination . . . to deal harshly 
with the Chinese people.”83  At least in some special instances, Goldstein 
concludes, the “institutional features” of the presidency “mitigate[d] the 
harshness of majority tyranny.”84 
Ronald Kahn provides a more abstract connection between executive 
power and individual rights.85  His analysis breaks down the conventional 
distinction between the polity principles typically taught in the first 
semester of constitutional law and the rights principles typically taught in 
the second semester of constitutional law.  As both Kahn and Justice 
Kennedy recognize, Americans adopted particular structures of government 
in large part because they thought particular governing arrangements were 
more likely than enumerated rights to protect fundamental freedoms.  In a 
concurring opinion declaring the line-item veto unconstitutional, Kennedy 
wrote, “[l]iberty is always at stake when one or more of the branches seek 
to transgress the separation of powers.”86  Kahn similarly states, “debates 
over polity principles informing the powers of government institutions raise 
                                                          
 78.  Id. at 194. 
 79.  See XI WANG, THE TRIAL OF DEMOCRACY: BLACK SUFFRAGE AND NORTHERN 
REPUBLICANS, 1860–1910, at 254–59 (1997). 
 80.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 81.  Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). 
 82.  Goldstein, supra note 77, at 194–95. 
 83.  Id. at 213. 
 84.  Id. at 214. 
 85.  Ronald Kahn, The Commerce Clause and Executive Power: Exploring Nascent 
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important questions about individual rights.”87  This fusion of polity and 
rights principles was particularly evident when the Supreme Court decided 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.88  Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in that case concluded, “the fragmentation of power produced by 
the structure of our Government is central to liberty.”89  Kahn and Justice 
Ginsburg disagree, but only because they see the Affordable Care Act not 
simply as within federal power, but as liberty enhancing.  Ginsburg points 
out, “[v]irtually everyone . . . consumes health care at some point in his or 
her life. . . . Health insurance is a means of paying for this care, nothing 
more.”90  Kahn emphasizes that executive and legislative powers are more 
to be feared in some instances than others.  He maintains, “eliminating 
privacy rights would allow government to abuse individuals and minority 
groups in ways that giving government permission to impact their economic 
decisions would not.”91 
Executive power is likely to remain at the core of American 
constitutionalism for the foreseeable future.  The National Surveillance 
State seems relatively enduring as President Obama modifies only at the 
margins Bush Administration policies and prefers not to implement more 
conservative rather than more liberal laws.92  Politics has been surprisingly 
stable since 1994. Democrats have won the popular vote in five of the last 
six Presidential elections.  Republicans have enjoyed a good margin in the 
House of Representatives for eight of the last ten Congresses.  The recent 
government shutdown highlights how polarization among elites remains 
vibrant.  Under these conditions, executives are likely to push for increased 
powers, while facing increased pushback from Congress and, perhaps, the 
courts. 
The articles in this symposium may nevertheless reflect a subtle turn in 
American thinking about the separation of powers.  The first wave of 
separation of powers thinking took place at a time when Republicans were 
thought to have a lock on the Electoral College and Democrats relatively 
permanent control of the House of Representatives.93  In this political 
environment, prominent conservatives developed the notion of a unitary 
executive, whose control over the executive branch could not be interfered 
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with by Congress.94  John Yoo, the architect of bold presidential war 
powers claims,95 was a member of the second Bush Administration.  This 
symposium may reflect a second wave of separation of powers thinking at a 
time when Democrats seem to have a greater lock on the Electoral College 
and Republicans more enduring control of the House of Representatives.96  
Some liberals, most notably Novkov and Fletcher, retain the previous 
generation’s skepticism about the merits of executive power.  Others, most 
notably Tipler and Chambers are more enthusiastic.  Their articles suggest 
the possibility of a new constitutional order in which liberals seek to expand 
the constitutional authority of Democrats in the White House, while more 
conservative scholars emphasize the virtues of a Congress controlled by 
Republicans.  After all, the articles in this volume and public discourse in 
2013 might have been quite different if the focus of debate over presidential 
domestic power was the refusal of a Republican president to implement the 
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act97 and an executive order 
interpreting the “arch of congressional legislation” as justifying a national 
ban on same-sex marriage. 
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